TaxIntellilytics Stories

The dispatch book · File 029 · last verified 28 October 2026

TaxIntellilytics Stories · The Dispatch Book · taxintellilyticsstories.com/research/reform-tracker/TIL-REF-2026-029 · printed

File 029 · from UNU-WIDER · to MoFPED and Parliament

Raise excise duty on mobile phone airtime from 12% to 15%.

2,340days in the tray, no public evidence of actionRecommended 1 Jun 2020

Evidence slip

Sent01.06.20ReviewedLawDone

From UNU-WIDER · to MoFPED (policy; presents tax bills) and Parliament (enactment) · Excise

“the excise duty on mobile phone airtime was increased from the current 12 per cent to 15 per cent ... might be a good tax reform if the objective is to raise more tax revenue”

section 6, PDF p.18

The desks

Sent01.06.20An analysis of the distributional impact of excise duty in U…
Reviewed
no evidence
Law
no evidence
Funded
no evidence
Under way
no evidence
Done
no evidence
Evaluated
no evidence

Sent, 1 June 2020. Recommended in An analysis of the distributional impact of excise duty in Uganda using a tax-benefit microsimulation model (WIDER Working Paper 2020/70) (section 6, PDF p.18).

The route slip

From finding to result, link by link

Each box is one link of the reform chain. ✓ documented; ? claimed but not documented; · no evidence yet, with what it needs. This file stops at: Action.

  1. FindingDocumentedRaising airtime excise from 12% to 15% would raise about UGX 8.4 bn a year without changing poverty or inequality (UGAMOD, 2019).
  2. ProblemDocumentedRevenue options with little distributional cost are needed.
  3. RecommendationDocumented"the excise duty on mobile phone airtime was increased from the current 12 per cent to 15 per cent ... might be a good tax reform if the objective is to raise more tax revenue" (UNU-WIDER (Kavuma, Byaruhanga, Musoke, Loke, Noble, Wright), section 6, PDF p.18)
  4. Legal powerDocumentedPFM Act 2015 s.8 (the Minister presents tax and revenue bills to Parliament); opened, PFMA-S8
  5. InstitutionNamedMoFPED (policy; presents tax bills) and Parliament (enactment)
  6. ActionNo evidence yetneeds a dated decision, response or delivery document
  7. OutputNo evidence yetneeds a published output measure
  8. OutcomeNo evidence yetneeds an outcome measure with a baseline
  9. EvaluationNo evidence yetneeds an evaluation with a stated method

Why it was recommended

Finding. Raising airtime excise from 12% to 15% would raise about UGX 8.4 bn a year without changing poverty or inequality (UGAMOD, 2019).

Problem. Revenue options with little distributional cost are needed.

Strength of the evidence behind it: medium.

Note. Framed by the authors as a scenario, not a firm recommendation. No airtime excise change after June 2020 is in the register.

Who has the power to act

MoFPED (policy; presents tax bills) and Parliament (enactment). Legal power checked: PFM Act 2015 s.8 (the Minister presents tax and revenue bills to Parliament); opened, PFMA-S8.

Sources

  • An analysis of the distributional impact of excise duty in Uganda using a tax-benefit microsimulation model (WIDER Working Paper 2020/70)
    UNU-WIDER (Kavuma, Byaruhanga, Musoke, Loke, Noble, Wright) · 2020-06-01 · section 6, Conclusion and recommendations, PDF pp.18 to 19
    https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2020/827-6